Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2003

Holly Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc.,
and Jon Fischer, and Patrick Benedict : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randy Dryer; Parson, Behle & Latimer; attorneys for appellee.
Don L. Davis, Robert C. Alden, Derek L. Davis; Byrd, Davis, Eisenberg, Walter & Furman; Liz King
Burgess; Clawson & Burgess; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, No. 20030854.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2470

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

NO. 20030854
IN THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stephen L. Henroid presiding

HOLLY WAYMENT
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
CLEAR CHANNEL BROADCASTING,
INC., A Texas Corporation dba KTVX
Channel 4, and JON FISCHER, and
PATRICK BENEDICT, Individuals
Defendants and Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

m 10 20M

DON L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 0548000)
ROBERT C. ALDEN (TX Bar No. 0097680)
DEREK L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 00793590)
BYRD, DAVIS, EISENBERG, WALTER
& FURMAN, L.L.P.
707 West 34th Street
Austin, Texas 78705
Telephone: 512-454-3751
Facsimile: 512-451-5857

RANDY DRYER
PARSON, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 85145
Telephone: 801-532-1234

LIZ KING BURGESS (4863)
CLAWSON BURGESS, LLC
350 South 400 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801-322-5000
Facsimile: 801-322-1471

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/
APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/
APPELLEE
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NO. 20030854
IN THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stephen L. Henroid presiding

HOLLY WAYMENT
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
CLEAR CHANNEL BROADCASTING,
INC., A Texas Corporation dba KTVX
Channel 4, and JON FISCHER, and
PATRICK BENEDICT, Individuals
Defendants and Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF
DON L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 0548000)
ROBERT C. ALDEN (TX Bar No. 0097680)
DEREK L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 00793590)
BYRD, DAVIS, EISENBERG, WALTER
& FURMAN, L.L.P.
707 West 34th Street
Austin, Texas 78705
Telephone: 512-454-3751
Facsimile: 512-451-5857

RANDY DRYER
PARSON, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 85145
Telephone: 801-532-1234
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/
APPELLANT

LIZ KING BURGESS (4863)
CLAWSON BURGESS, LLC
350 South 400 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801-322-5000
Facsimile: 801-322-1471
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/
APPELLEE
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents

1

Table of Authorities

2

Argument

3

Reply Issue No. 1:
Ms, Wayment is neither a "general purpose" public figure nor a
"limited purpose" public figure as defined by the United States
Supreme Court

3

A. Ms. Wayment had not achieved general fame or
notoriety in the community, and did not have pervasive
involvement in the affairs of society

.4

B. Since there was no "public controversy/' Ms.
Wayment is not a "limited purpose" public figure

7

Reply Issue No. 2:
The qualified privilege is defeated by evidence that Mr. Benedict
knowingly made false, defamatory statements about the reasons for
Ms. Wayment's leaving her employment
Conclusion.....

9
10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Wavmentv CCn ** *i - n~~u. n-:s

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 508 F. Supp. 1249, (D. Mass. 1981).

.

7

Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980)

7

Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 A.D.2d294 (1981)

8

Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982)

7

Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, (1974)...
Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693 (1979)

3,4
8

Hutchinson v.Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111(1978)

.....7

Russell v. Daily Spectrum, 842 P.Wd 896 (Utah 1992)

3, 10

San Antonio Express v. Dracos, 922 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App. 1996)

5, 6

Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976)

8

Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C.Cir. 1980)

7

Law Review Articles
Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 906, 916 (1984)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

1

ARGUMENT
It is axiomatic that in reviewing a summary judgment, this Court views all the
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to he nonmoving party.
Defendant's factual and legal arguments ignore this standard and would have the
Court decide the case taking its version of the facts as true while ignoring the
evidence proffered by Plaintiff. It is important to remember that Ms. Wayment had
simply approached her managers with an idea for a public relations/ community
involvement project for the station. She did not know that another reporter had
already been hired to take over her health reporting. Her idea was used as a pretext
for her firing, then used as the basis for defamatory statements which ruined her
reputation and served as a rationale for management letting her go.
The remainder of this reply brief will be limited to addressing the arguments
offered by Defendant regarding Ms. Wayment's status as a public figure and the
operation of the qualified privilege.

REPLY ISSUE NO. 1:
Ms. Wayment is neither a "general purpose" public figure nor a
"limited purpose" public figure as defined by the United States
Supreme Court.
As the Court noted in Russell v. Daily Spectrum, 842 P.2d 896, 903 n.20 (Utah
1992) citing, Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), "[f]or the heightened
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protection of actual malice to apply, a plaintiff must be either a public figure or a
public official. A public figure is one who has either (1) attained special prominence
in the affairs of socity and thus assumes a public figure role voluntarily, or (2) thrust
himself or herself to the forefront of public controversies in order to affect the
outcome of those controversies.5' "Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety
in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life." Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 352. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, Ms. Wayment is neither a general purpose
public figure nor a limited purpose public figure.
A. Ms. Wayment had not achieved general fame or notoriety in the
community, and did not have pervasive involvement in the affairs of
society.
In Gertz, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court; described general purpose, or all purpose,
public figures as follows: "For the most part those who attain this status have assumed
roles of special prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes."
Id. at 345. As one commentator has phrased it:
"This description of a public figure immediately calls to mind certain
types of individuals: the chairman of the board of General Motors; the
president of the AFL-CIO; the archbishop of Boston; the publisher of
the New York Times; the anchorman of the CBS Evening News; the
chairman of the Democratic National Committee; the president of
Harvard University; the head of the Ford Foundation; and so on. In
each of these and in innumerable other cases, a nominally private
person exercises as much, if not more, influence on the determination
of public policy issues as do many public officials."
Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 906, 916 (1984).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ms. Wayment is not such figure; she was the health reporter for a local
television station. In the hierarchy of KTVX, she was not a weekday anchor, nor was
she even a weekend anchor, she was simply a reporter that covered health stories.
Defendants failed to present evidence that Ms. Wayment had achieved "general fame
or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society"
such as to warrant general purpose public figure status.
There is no judicially-formulated rule that journalists and television reporters
are general purpose public figures. Defendant cites an intermediate appellate court in
Texas to argue for this proposition. Looking more closely at the facts of that case,
we find that it is the exception, rather than the rule.
In San Antonio Express News v. Draco, 922 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.App.—San
Antonio 1996, no writ.), the plaintiff in a defamation case was Ted Draco, a
television journalist.1 Draco had quit his job at KENS-TV and his departure was
reported unfavorably in Defendant's newspaper, the San Antonio Express News. Mr.
Draco was notorious for his own brand of "gotcha" journalism, "he developed highly
popular and innovative news segments, both nationally and locally." Id. at 253.
"His 'Eyewitness-Wants-to-Know' segment on KENS-TV became
'one of the highest rated news segments in San Antonio and
'received more view response than any segment in the South Texas
market.' The 'Eyewitness-Wants-to-Know5 format was also highly
accusatory in nature. To be the subject of one of these programs was
not good news to the individual involved. There were no
compliments, and the criticisms were harsh. Both private and public
figures were put on the rack by Dracos, who did not hesitate to lay
on the verbal whip."
1

As denoted by its "no writ" designation, this case was never reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court.
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Id. "He had frequently been featured in San Antionio newspapers." Id. And the
coverage was not favorable, as it called into question whether the alleged scandals he
covered were real or fabricated. Id.
This was not the first time he had quit his job at KENS-TV, and it was not the
first time he had sued the newspaper for defamation. In the prior litigation, "the
parties had stipulated as evidenced by the signature of their counsel ... that for the
purposes of this lawsuit Plaintiff was a public figure as that term is defined by the
United States Supreme Court in the cases of New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz
v. Welch." M
In short, Holly Wayment is no Ted Dracos. For obvious reasons, the court in
San Antonio Express News v. Draco had no trouble finding that Ted Dracos was a
general purpose public figure—he had stipulated to that fact in a prior defamation
case. Furthermore, the finding that he was a public figure is nearly gratuitous on the
part of the Texas court since it had aheady determined that the allegedly defamatory
statements he alleged were, in fact, substantially true. This case does not stand for
the proposition that all television journalists are general purpose public figures.
Finally, the cases cited by the Dracos court do not stand for the proposition
that journalists and television reporters are routinely considered general purpose
public figures. To the contrary, the Dracos court makes no such claim, and the cases
it cites more often refer to journalist who became limited purpose public figures
because they had injected themselves into ongoing public controversies. Id. at 252-
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53. This distinction is crucial: a limited purpose public figure is one who has thrust
himself into the forefront of a particular public controversy. This is an occupational
hazard for journalists covering controversial events.

In Ms. Wayment's case,

however, there never was a public controversy.
B. Since there was no "public controversy/' Ms. Wayment is not a
"limited purpose" public figure.
A "limited purpose" public figures is a person who thrusts "himself-or herself
to the forefront of public controversies in order to affect the outcome of those
controversies.'5 Russell supra. A public controversy is "a specific public dispute that
has foreseeable and substantial ramifications beyond its immediate participants."
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C.Cir. 1980.)
The defamation itself cannot create the public controversy. "Clearly, those
charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by
making the claimant a public figure." Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. I l l , 135
(1978).
The controversy must pre-exist the defamatory statement.

Fitzgerald v.

Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668-69 (4th Cir. 1982) (extensive press coverage
of the military applications of dolphin technology pre-existed defendants statements
on that topic); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 591
(1st Cir. 1980) (no pre-existing controversy because no evidence anyone discussed
plaintiffs fishing boats prior to defendant's criticism); Waldbaum v. Fairchild
Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297, 1299 (D.C. Cir.) (controversies involving
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiff developed before defendant's allegedly defamatory publication), cert, denied,
I
449 U.S. 898 (1980); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 508 F.
Supp. 1249, 1272-73 (D. Mass. 1981) (defendant entered pre-existing controversy
precipitated by plaintiffs advertising campaign); Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83
A.D.2d 294, 445 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1981) (no public controversy existed in which
plaintiff could have participated); Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d
988, 993-94 (1979) (no public debate over amphetamines when plaintiff doctor
prescribed amphetamine-type drugs for which he was criticized).
In the present case there simply was no pre-existing public controversy. Ms.
Wayment approached management with an idea for helping kids who had cancer.
Nothing ever became of it, except that it was used as a pretext for firing Ms.
Wayment since KTVX had recently hired a more prominent journalist from another
station to take her place. In fact, even after the defamation took place, there was no
public controversy. Ms. Wayment's departure did not receive any contemporaneous
media attention.2 After this lawsuit was filed, she was interviewed by newspaper
reporters; but responding to a newspaper's inquires after a lawsuit is filed does not
turn a private dispute into a public controversy. Time, Inc. v. Firestone^ 424 U.S. 448
(1976).
Because Ms. Wayment did not inject herself into a pre-existing public
controversy, she is not a limited purpose public figure.

2

This further underscores the fact that Ms. Wayment is not a general purpose public figure.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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REPLY ISSUE NO. 2
The qualified privilege is defeated by evidence that Mr. Benedict
knowingly made false, defamatory statements about the reasons for
Ms. Wayment's leaving her employment.
Defendant argues that an independent basis for affirming the
summary judgment is that the defamation was protected by a qualified
privilege between an employer and an employee. This is not correct because
Mr. Benedict knew the defamatory statements were false, and a "knowing"
mental state satisfies the common-law and statutory standards for malice.
Mr. Benedict told Jeremy Castellano, a photographer at Channel 4,
that Ms. Wayment "abused her contacts as a reporter" and "she was in charge
of a large sum of money"; and explained she was fired because "you can't do
stories on a place you're receiving money from and just a lot about being
unethical." (Castellano, p. 35,11. 15 - 24, p. 36,1.2). In his deposition, Mr.
Benedict admitted that he knew Ms. Wayment had "not accepted any
monetary remuneration from The Huntsman." (Benedict, p. 13,1. 11)
"The appropriate degree of malice that must be proven to successfully
overcome the statutory privilege is the common law standard from which the
statute derived. This standard creates, in effect, an absolute privilege of a
defendant's statements unless the statements were made with ill will, were
excessively published, or the defendant did not reasonably believe his or
her statements were true." Russell, 842 P.2d at 904-5 (emphasis supplied).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

The summary judgment evidence in this case demonstrates that Mr. Benedict
I
knew his statements were not true. Thus., the standard for common-law malice
is satisfied.
CONCLUSION

i

For purposes of this litigation, Ms. Wayment is neither a general purpose nor
limited purpose public figure. Therefore, the constitutional actual malice standards
i

do not apply to her defamation action. Even if they did, however, such standards
would be satisfied given the evidence that defamatory statements were made with
actual knowledge of their falsity. Actual knowledge of falsity also satisfies the
common law definition of malice, so as to overcome any qualified privileges.
The granting of summary judgment in this case was inappropriate, and Plaintiff
respectfully requests that the judgment be reversed and this case be remanded for trial
on the merits.
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